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THIS POLICY BRIEF is the second in 
a three-part series designed to assist 
policymakers, analysts, law enforcement 
offi cers and others concerned about 
subduing organised crime to better 
understand the structure of the networks 
involved. The series profi les the dynamic 
context in which crime networks exist, 
and the strategic relationships that 
contribute to their resilience and, to 
some extent, determine the impact of 
their activities. The purpose is to support 
policies and measures against organised 
crime that are comprehensive, more 
effective, and sustainable by providing 
practical advice and recommendations 
on mapping crime networks in their 
environment, with particular reference to 
Southern Africa.
The dynamics of crime 
networks and regional 
responses in Southern Africa
This policy brief was motivated by 
concern for the quality and sources of 
data on contemporary organised crime. 
Its purpose is to suggest improvements 
in the gathering, structuring, 
interpretation, and ultimate use of data 
on crime networks and the infrastructure 
that sustains them. It is based on fi ndings 
from general research on crime trends 
conducted since the turn of the century 
and an ongoing study of the impact 
Summary
Current perceptions of organised crime are too rigid and narrow. The 
defi nition of organised crime should consider it as comprising a set of core 
activities and should also encompass the ancillary acts of those who assist 
core actors. To gather information on the reach of criminal networks and 
establish how they sustain themselves, the authorities should perceive 
such networks as organisations involved in business. Furthermore, 
organised crime is transnational and market based, but attempts to deal 
with it are constrained by state sovereignty. The effective disruption of 
crime networks should be informed by a network analysis that transcends 
national borders, while legal procedures should be harmonised across 
such borders.
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1A broad defi nition of organised crime should be adopted in 
the region, preferably through a 
regional protocol. 
2Member countries of the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs 
Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) 
should harmonise strategies against 
organised crime by: 
 •  Adopting an expanded 
defi nition of organised crime 
that takes account of fl uid and 
amorphous criminal networks 
 •  Coordinating procedures 
for gathering, managing and 
interpreting data on crime 
networks
 •  Strengthening domestic 
structures for gathering 
such data
 •  Creating units to gather, 
manage and interpret data on 
crime networks where countries 
do not have such units
 •  Strengthening these units 
through adequate training 
and regular updates on crime 
trends and new methods for 
gathering data and mobilising 
crime intelligence
3Law enforcement agencies should consider adopting social network 
analysis as a tool to organise, manage 
and interpret data on crime networks.
Recommendations
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of networked crime on governance. 
Crime analyst Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane 
remarked in 2007 that: 
Crime networks cannot operate 
without a degree of support from 
the public and private sectors. 
Some of this is based on the 
corruption of offi cials. This kind of 
collaboration between functionaries 
and criminals can sabotage the 
attempts of governments to fulfi l their 
Modern organised crime brings criminal 
networks into close proximity with 
public offi cials (especially, but not 
only, the police, who are tasked with 
suppressing crime) and with the business 
sector. Since these groupings coexist 
in a common environment, they are 
bound to interact. In the last 15 years 
the relationships resulting from various 
intersections have come under intense 
scrutiny in various countries. A two-
volume set of monographs edited by 
Gastrow in 2003 considered the extent to 
which state and business institutions in 
Southern Africa had been ‘penetrated’ by 
organised crime networks.2
While the general theme suggested 
unidirectional relationships, in which 
criminals enticed and corrupted hitherto 
honest bureaucrats and business people, 
some individual contributions indicated 
that the linkages are more complex. As 
experiences from various parts of the 
world show, illicit relationships are not 
always initiated or managed by criminal 
networks. The control centre of a given 
illicit enterprise can shift with changes in 
circumstance or in response to external 
developments. Crime networks often fi nd 
it expedient to infl uence both the state 
and business. 
Such networks require legitimate 
business structures to conceal their 
activities or to transfer the proceeds 
of crime to the mainstream economy. 
Equally, public offi cials can abuse their 
positions and/or power to exploit crime 
networks, while in competitive contexts 
legitimate business may use corrupt 
practices or engage in criminality to 
gain an unfair advantage. It is fair to 
speak of a loose triangular framework 
responsibilities, for example to address 
poverty and inequality in the region.1
Currently, however, anomalies exist in the 
way in which crime networks are offi cially 
perceived. While these perceptions are 
often based on defi nitions in the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC), they 
appear to be outmoded and arguably 
defi ne organised crime too narrowly. 
Experiences from the Southern African 
region and studies conducted outside 
it show that often organised crime 
networks exist as business structures 
that sustain themselves through 
linkages with state functionaries and 
legitimate business. 
Over the years it has become clear that 
some of the crime networks active in the 
region have global linkages. Strategies 
to confront organised crime should 
therefore be better informed about the 
reach of criminal markets and about 
who constitutes crime networks. Despite 
SARPCCO initiatives, current strategies in 
Southern Africa are uneven both in scope 
and depth, which may be attributable 
to the absence of a common regional 
position. The resulting misalignment is 
refl ected in haphazard approaches to 
organised crime across the region.
Often organised crime networks exist as business 
structures that sustain themselves through linkages 
with state functionaries and legitimate business
IT IS FAIR TO SPEAK OF 
A LOOSE TRIANGULAR 
FRAMEWORK OF ORGANISED 
CRIME, THE STATE AND 
BUSINESS
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of organised crime, the state and 
business that is occasionally visible, but 
often obscured by misconceptions about 
organised crime. 
Rethinking organised crime
The fi rst hurdle to be cleared in charting 
a new path to deal with organised crime 
is to revise how such crime is perceived. 
The prevailing perception, which is 
strongly infl uenced by interpretations 
ancillary actors. In a drug-traffi cking 
case, the courier in whose possession 
drugs are intercepted would be a core 
actor, while the dishonest offi cial who 
receives a bribe in order to turn a blind 
eye would be an ancillary actor, as would 
be a police offi cial who, subsequent to 
the seizure of the drugs, steals them from 
the exhibit room and sells them. A more 
dramatic impact is that the redefi nition 
would bring in sole criminals who 
commit crimes that are planned and/or 
premeditated. 
In order to gather information on criminal 
networks’ reach and establish how 
they sustain themselves, the authorities 
should perceive such networks as 
organisations involved in business. It has 
indeed been suggested that the essence 
of organised crime is ‘illicit enterprise’ 
or ‘criminal business’.3 In conducting 
business, criminal networks are often 
decentralised. There is a general 
recognition that criminal hierarchies are 
the exception rather than the norm, 
hence the widespread acceptance of 
the term ‘crime networks’.
Criminal networks dependent on 
commodity traffi cking have become 
sophisticated enough to link production 
sites on one continent to transit zones 
on a different continent and markets on 
a third. These sophisticated networks 
are most noticeable in the drug trade, 
but they are also encountered in 
illicit wildlife product and counterfeit 
commodity trading. 
The secretariat of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) recently characterised 
rhino horn traffi cking as ‘one of the 
of UNTOC, is rigid and narrow. It is 
preoccupied with a threshold in the 
number of participants, which defi nes 
out solitary cyber criminals and throws 
up legalistic debates on the concept 
of common purpose. This leads to a 
defi nition that is quite out of sync with the 
most harmful forms of crime encountered 
today. It also ignores the sophistication 
and ‘globalisation’ of crime. 
A preferable view is to consider 
organised crime as comprising a set of 
core activities that may be committed 
by a single person or a group and may 
be supported by ancillary activities. The 
activities are distinguished by their gravity 
and the level of planning required in 
multiple spheres in which the activities 
and their proceeds manifest themselves. 
The core activities would admittedly 
include all the predatory and market-
dependent crimes currently commonly 
perceived as organised criminal activities. 
However, organised crime would also 
encompass the ancillary acts of others 
who assist the core actors. For instance, 
in credit card fraud committed by card 
cloning, the runners that copy the credit 
cards would qualify as core actors while 
the money launderers who process the 
proceeds of the fraud would qualify as 
The fi rst hurdle to be cleared in charting a new path 
to deal with organised crime is to revise how such 
crime is perceived
CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
DEPENDENT ON COMMODITY 
TRAFFICKING HAVE BECOME 
SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO 
LINK PRODUCTION SITES ON ONE 
CONTINENT TO TRANSIT ZONES 
ON A DIFFERENT CONTINENT 
AND MARKETS ON A THIRD
MAPPING CRIME NETWORKS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A NEW APPROACH4
POLICY BRIEF
most structured criminal activities facing 
CITES’.4 For purposes of interdiction, 
the criminal market should be defi ned 
as including suppliers, couriers and 
distributers situated at various points 
along the route from procurement to 
marketing sites through zones of transit. 
Comprehensive international cooperation 
and coordination are therefore imperative. 
Misconceptions appear to exist about 
the realms in which criminal business 
is conducted. As in other parts of the 
world, the regional experience is that 
no sphere of business is absolutely 
out of bounds for criminal networks. 
Political elites occupy the position of 
gatekeepers to regional economies. 
Access to extractive natural resources, 
for instance, often depends on striking 
deals with local political elites. Criminal 
networks share a common interest 
with such elites in participating in 
lucrative spheres such as mining, timber 
harvesting and marine resources. 
The convergence of interest takes the 
form of shady activities and predatory 
criminality, such as irregularly awarded 
contracts for the exploitation of natural 
resources or for the smuggling of 
precious minerals and contraband into 
and from the region. The complicity of 
elites in the public sector explains the 
resilience of predatory activities even 
in unexpected activities, such as the 
poaching of wildlife. 
Corruption fuelled by neo-patrimonialism 
is the single most obvious structural 
factor underpinning relations among 
organised criminals, state functionaries 
and legitimate business. It lowers the risk 
of interruption. The informal networks 
that perpetuate these relations are in 
some cases complex and concealed, 
but in other instances fairly brazen and 
straightforward.5 Spaces that are either 
ungoverned or weakly regulated offer 
exploitable opportunities for criminal 
networks. Furthermore, signifi cant 
criminal networks are likely to have 
some representation or presence 
in areas where there is substantial 
economic activity (often in urban areas), 
because major sources of wealth are 
springboards of infl uence and power. 
In mapping crime networks, the role of 
crime intelligence analysis is to determine 
whether the networks are represented 
directly or indirectly in the core sectors of 
the economy. 
Strengthening responses to 
organised crime
Current responses to organised crime 
have been criticised on the basis that, 
while recognising that the priority forms 
of organised crime are transnational 
and market based, they continue to 
be constrained by state sovereignty. 
Sovereignty has a double-edged 
impact on combating transnational 
organised crime. It implies authority 
over a given territory, which can either 
assist or inhibit the capacity to deal 
with organised crime. In political 
governance, sovereignty implies 
authority over critical aspects whose 
management affects the existence 
and continuity of the state. Crucially, 
sovereignty expresses authority to 
perform certain functions and to prevent 
certain actions. These functions include 
Corruption fuelled by neo-patrimonialism is the single 
most obvious structural factor underpinning relations 
among organised criminals, state functionaries and 
legitimate business
CRIMINAL NETWORKS SHARE 
A COMMON INTEREST WITH 
SUCH ELITES IN PARTICIPATING 
IN LUCRATIVE SPHERES 
SUCH AS MINING, TIMBER 
HARVESTING AND MARINE 
RESOURCES
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The operatives of the four countries 
dealt with two very clearly structured 
syndicates. Both syndicates had 
ascertainable links in Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa 
and Botswana. Many of the leading 
fi gures were arrested during and after 
the operation, but there is nothing 
to suggest that their operations 
were effectively curtailed. Many of 
the operations are run as family 
businesses. Thus, when one top 
operative is arrested, the remaining 
members continue with the business 
until they have been arrested as 
well. In many instances, the different 
syndicates help one another or share 
business, although there may be in 
confl ict at times. 11
Information on the separate components 
of a crime network is not likely to be 
found in one locality. It will invariably be 
dispersed in different countries, where it 
may be picked up by different persons 
and/or institutions. Who then should 
collate the data, analyse it and interpret 
it? Answering this question becomes 
more signifi cant if one takes into account 
that countries may be affected differently 
by the activities of a crime network, 
depending on the nature of the market in 
which it operates. 
Several cases drawn from abalone 
(perlemoen) traffi cking indicate that 
traffi cking networks tend to establish the 
strongest links at points where the risk of 
disruption is at its highest. In the South 
African context these are places where 
the harvesting and drying processes of 
abalone occur.12 Because there is also the 
risk of interception during transportation, 
it may be necessary to manage this 
through the use of compromised public 
offi cials along transit routes, including 
exit ports. Quite often the responsibility 
to intercept illicit cross-border trading 
activities is shared among the police, 
specialist wildlife management units and 
customs agencies. In the absence of 
the ability to pass laws, control exit 
and entry to a country, appoint offi cials, 
coin money and exercise control using 
violence where necessary.6 But, as 
Torkelson points out: 
Sovereignty has always been an 
ambition built on the dialectic between 
idea and practice. Sovereignty can be 
usefully understood as the capacity 
to exercise one’s (the nation state’s, 
the monarch’s, a power holder’s) will 
networks do not defer to national 
borders.8 SARPCCO’s October 1997 
Agreement in Respect of Co-operation 
and Mutual Assistance in the Field of 
Crime Combating recognises this. It 
allows police offi cials to conduct cross-
border investigations with the assistance 
of their counterparts in the foreign 
country in question, but not to arrest 
criminals in this country. The agreement 
sets out a framework that needs to 
be complemented by information on 
connections among various players in a 
criminal network. 
With transnational crime benefi tting 
from the limits that sovereignty has 
conferred on the state, states and their 
law enforcement bodies need effective 
new means of sharing information 
across borders. Therefore it can be 
argued that effective disruption of crime 
networks should be preceded and 
informed by a network analysis.9 One 
of the primary advantages of network 
analysis is that:
It steers the investigator or analyst 
away from simple dichotomies 
and towards a view of actors of all 
types engaging in numerous forms 
of relationships with one another. It 
reduces all the major paradigms on 
the relationship between underworld 
and upper world to their most basic 
component – human relationships.10
The objective must be to avoid the 
incomplete operations that former 
SARPCCO head Frank Msutu 
lamented more than a decade ago. 
Commenting on the aftermath of a 
SARPCCO operation conducted in 
2000, he said:
over a given territory (physical, social, 
geographical, economic) over time. 
Given this defi nition, it is clear that 
sovereignty should not be understood 
in the singular, but that multiple, 
overlapping sovereignties can emerge 
in various sub-national, national, and 
transnational contexts to exercise 
power in the contemporary world.7
It is debatable whether the economies 
of post-colonial states, locked as they 
were as colonies into global networks 
largely driven from the erstwhile colonial 
capitals, ever became truly sovereign. 
The advent of market globalisation 
placed the ideal of sovereignty further 
away and accelerated the emergence of 
competing centres capable of contesting 
one or more capacities hitherto claimed 
by the state. At the same time, uneven 
economies and criminality combined 
to test the capacity of various states to 
manage their borders. The transnational 
criminal markets that have become part 
of the post-colonial experience require 
globalised responses. 
Public policing agencies are the main 
institutions expected to detect and 
disrupt the activities of networked 
criminals. They are aware that crime 
The transnational criminal markets that have 
become part of the post-colonial experience require 
globalised responses
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streamlined, accountable coordination 
and management, the multiplicity of 
agencies widens the scope for corruption. 
The author’s experience is that criminals 
are pursued most intensely in the 
countries that perceive themselves to 
be adversely affected by the crimes 
considered carefully, taking account of 
the existing priority organised criminal 
activities and the nature of current 
criminal networks, but also anticipating 
future developments. 
Since the purpose of introducing such 
a protocol would be to enable various 
The absence of a regional framework against 
organised crime means that the regulatory terrain 
in the region is uneven
involved. Hence, the most signifi cant 
abalone-traffi cking cases have been 
initiated in South Africa, as the primary 
source country. Similarly, rhino-poaching 
and ivory-smuggling cases appear to 
be pursued in the countries in which 
rhino and elephant numbers are rapidly 
declining. This level of commitment is 
not necessarily the case in the other 
countries that are equally important to 
the investigations. 
What is proposed is the tracking of crime 
networks on the initiative of any other 
country – whether this is a country of 
transit or the destination of contraband. 
For this to occur, an up-to-date regional 
crime network database has to exist. 
Such a database is the aggregation 
of numerous separately generated 
crime network analyses. This raises the 
question of who should put it together. 
If it is separately compiled, how are the 
quality and reliability of the information 
to be ensured? 
Alignment of legal regimes 
A critical step to be taken across the 
Southern African region is to harmonise 
criminal justice procedures. The Southern 
Africa Development Community 
(SADC) has endeavoured to do this for 
corruption and fi rearms management 
through protocols. A similar approach 
on organised crime may be appropriate. 
The content of the protocol needs to be 
jurisdictions to collect information of 
compatible quality, the protocol needs 
to address not just the substantive 
criminal law, but also encourage the 
harmonisation of procedures. UNTOC 
and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption offer a guide on 
the required procedural innovations. 
In Southern Africa, the benchmark 
may be found in existing legislation 
against organised crime in South Africa, 
Mauritius and Namibia.13 The legislation 
is signifi cant in that it inspires and guides 
supportive strategies on collecting 
crime intelligence, protecting witnesses 
and extra-territorial collaboration 
with counterparts. 
The absence of a regional framework 
against organised crime means that 
the regulatory terrain in the region is 
uneven.14 Police agencies in countries still 
without such legislation, which include 
Malawi, Lesotho and Tanzania, have 
largely adopted informal defi nitions of 
organised crime.15
The uneven uptake of the necessary 
mechanisms to combat organised 
crime has negative implications for the 
gathering of information critical to the 
social network analysis suggested. 
Furthermore, not all countries will create 
regulated frameworks by which to gather 
information on functional and social 
relationships among crime network 
A CRITICAL STEP TO BE 
TAKEN ACROSS THE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION 
IS TO HARMONISE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROCEDURES
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members through surveillance and 
intercepting communications. 
It may take longer to secure the fi nancial, 
technological and human resources 
required. Therefore, while it is useful, the 
SARPCCO agreement on cross-border 
collaboration is clearly not suffi cient to 
facilitate standard crime-network data 
collection. If the frameworks expected to 
emerge from new legislation to combat 
networked crime in such countries as 
South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius are 
It might be too ambitious to expect 
policies on law enforcement that have 
existed for a long time to be replaced 
by a new policy that is underpinned by 
regional hegemony. Despite the efforts 
of SARPCCO over the years, SADC 
has yet to develop the capacity to 
confront transnational threats, including 
organised crime. 
It may well be that for this to happen a 
compelling argument for the convergence 
of certain aspects of existing policies 
to combat organised crime needs to 
be made. Some of the areas by which 
convergence is achievable have been 
highlighted in this policy brief. Policy 
convergence should be the outcome 
of harmonisation in the objectives of 
gathering, managing and analysing data 
on networked crime. The utility of the 
framework crystallised by the SARPCCO 
agreement on cross-border collaboration 
will be enhanced if the analysis of crime 
networks proposed is implemented. This 
will in turn make it easier to determine 
the content and reach of a regional 
instrument on organised crime.
to succeed, capacity in neighbouring 
countries has to be simultaneously 
enhanced. 
Conclusion 
As long as it is accepted that criminal 
markets enable various criminal networks 
to acquire signifi cant but illegitimate 
infl uence, determining how these 
networks are composed and how they 
sustain themselves will always be a 
matter of priority. As Torkelson puts it:
Criminal sovereigns have shown that 
they can replicate the locus of power 
in fractal form, so that it ultimately 
becomes decentred or dislocated 
from the ideal of transcendent state 
rule. This is why sovereignty is a 
useful way of looking at organised 
crime, because it could mitigate 
growing limitations in existing thinking 
about the relationships between 
state and non-state, legal and illegal, 
and local and global. Understanding 
criminal actors in this way has serious 
implications for our current state-
based modes of policing, and should 
allow for transnational interventions to 
be pursued.16
A compelling argument for the convergence of certain 
aspects of existing policies to combat organised crime 
needs to be made
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